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A b s t r a c t  T his p ap e r discusses a  P o st-K ey n esian  m odel of incom e, p roduc tion , and  trad e . T he 
one country, one sector m odel featu res K aleckian investm ent dem and, K aldorian  p ro d u c tiv ity  and 
a labor m arket m odule based  011 a wage price spiral. T he m odel is first p resen ted  for a closed 
econom y w ith  exogenous real wages; second, for a closed econom y w ith  endogenous real wages; th ird , 
for an  econom y open  to  tra d e  w ith  endogenous real wages. S im ulations w ith  different ca lib rations 
show key charac teristics of th e  m odel. M onte C arlo sim ulations over reasonable p aram ete r ranges 
shed some light 011 th e  effectiveness of wage policies in open economies.
K e y w o rd s  K aleckian dem and , K aldorian  productiv ity , M onte C arlo sim ulation  
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1 Introduction
T his p ap e r a tte m p ts  to  fu rth e r our u n d ers tan d in g  of a P o st-K ey n esian  m acroeconom ic m odel of the  
real side by (1) endogenizing wage, price and  p ro d u c tiv ity  in an  otherw ise s tan d a rd  N eo-K aleckian  
fram ew ork, and  (2) investigating  m odel sensitiv ity  to  different p a ram ete r regim es using M onte 
C arlo analysis. T he la tte r  is aim ed a t th e  d eb a te  in P ost K eynesian  research regard ing  th e  n a tu re  
of th e  dem and  regim e as e ith er profit led or wage led, and  consequences therefrom  for d istrib u tiv e  
policies in an  open economy.
T he discussion rests on two s tran d s  of lite ra tu re . F irs t, th e  N eo-K aleckian  lite ra tu re  on in­
te rac tio n s betw een th e  ra te  of capacity  u tiliza tio n  and  th e  d is trib u tio n  of incom e, see R ow thorn  
(1982), D u tt  (1984), Taylor (1985), B h ad u ri and  M arglin  (1990) and  Lavoie (1995). In  a nutshell, 
grow th  m ust be wage led in th e  ” s tag n a tio n is t” K aleckian m odel, and  can be profit led in th e  
’’ex h ilira tio n is t” version, if th e  positive response of investm ent dem and  to  p ro fitab ility  outw eighs 
th e  negative response of consum ption  dem and  via th e  th e  m ultip lier. T he d is trib u tio n  of incom e 
is fully d eterm ined  by th e  degree of m onopoly, and  a shock to  th e  m a rk -u p  leads to  a decrease in 
ra te s  of profit and  u tiliza tio n — th e  paradox  of cost— if dem and  is w age-led , and  to  an  increase in 
ra te s  of profit and  u tiliza tion  if dem and  is profit led. Second, a cornerstone of K aldorian  grow th 
m odels is th e  K aldor V erdoorn law, see K aldor (1978), T hirlw all (1983) as well as con tribu tions
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in M cCom bic ct al. (2003). In  a nu tshell, th e  K aldo r-V erdoorn  law determ ines labor p ro d u c tiv ity  
grow th  as a function of dem and  grow th. N aastep ad  (2006) and  R ad a  and  Taylor (2006) em ploy 
rules of th e  K aldor V erdoorn ty p e  to  endogenize p ro d u c tiv ity  in m odels w ith  K aleckian invest­
m ent. In  these m odels, nom inal wage and  price rem ain  exogenous. T he wage share th en  m ust fall 
over an  expansion, unless it is assum ed th a t  real wage grow th  m atches (or exceeds) p ro d u c tiv ity  
grow th. F u rth er, exports  are in troduced  as a function  of real u n it labor cost, ex tend ing  th e  d irect 
link betw een dom estic dem and  and  d is trib u tio n  to  th e  foreign sector. T he resu lting  dem and  regim e 
tends m ore strongly  to  be profit led. Blecker (1989), in co n tras t, shows how th e  sim ple s tag n a ­
tion ist K aleckian m odel can ten d  to  re lax  th e  parad o x  of cost if th e  econom y is open to  trad e , and 
exports  arc a function  of th e  real exchange ra te . However, in th a t  m odel wages an d  p ro d u c tiv ity  
arc exogenous.
How does such a Kalecki K aldor m odel behave w ith  endogenous nom inal wage, price an d  p ro­
ductiv ity?  How does tra d e  affect such a m odel? These are th e  two questions posed, and  in th e  
following sections I p resen t a Kalecki K aldor m odel of a closed econom y (section 2), th en  include 
a wage curve and  m ark  up  equa tion  (section 3), and  lastly  open th e  econom y to  trad e  (section 4). 
Scction 4 closcs w ith  an  exam ination  of p a ram ete r configurations th a t  w ould su p p o rt th e  effective­
ness of wage policies in an  open economy. Scction 5 discusses sim ulations of such and  o th er shocks 
based  on a variety  of different m odel ca librations: scction 6 takes th is  approach  a step  fu rther, 
exam ining M onte C arlo sim ulations of different m odel calib ra tions as well as m odel responses to  
shocks. Section 7 concludes.
Before tak in g  off, though , a couple of com m ents on scope and  approach  arc in order. F irs t, 
b o th  th e  K aleckian and  K aldo rian  m odels are called grow th  m odels, b u t th e  view tak en  here is 
th a t  th e  ra te  of capacity  u tiliza tio n  is no t th e  ad ju stin g  variable in th e  long run . Sim ilarly, th e  
K aldor V erdoorn law m ight be b e tte r  su ited  to  th e  short run . T he m odel(s) p resen ted  here will 
be in te rp re ted  in th e  sho rt run , and, correspondingly, th e  cap ita l stock is tak en  as fixed. Second, 
th e  m odel com bines goods and  labor m arket, b u t leaves finance ou t of th e  p ictu re . T h ird , th e  
m odel is s ta tic , and  therefore cannot be com pared to  cyclical m odels, w hich can describe dynam ics 
and  grow th around  an  u n stab le  equilibrium  w ith  s ta tio n a ry  s ta te  variables. T he sem inal reference 
here is G oodw in (1967), and , i.e., B arbosa-F ilho  and  Taylor (2007) p resen t a recent exam ple. This 
lite ra tu re  inform s th e  discussion, b u t clearly has a different scope. Lastly, th e  m odel is p resented  
in grow th  ra tes, w hich simplifies analysis, and  enables detailed  com parative s ta tic  exercises.
2 A K alecki—Kaldor m odel o f a closed econom y
T he m odel of th is  section is a closed econom y version of N aastep ad  (2006) and  R ad a  and  Taylor 
(2006), section 7. T he focus of th e  form er is to  in troduce a real wage effect on productiv ity , arguing 
th a t  firms su b s titu te  away from labor w ith  rising costs for th e  la tte r , th u s  inducing technical change. 
As a resu lt, wage re s tra in t can lead to  s tag n a tio n  as well as a slowdown in p ro d u c tiv ity  grow th. T he 
focus of th e  la tte r  (w ith  regard  to  th is  m odel) is to  discuss th e  im plications of shocks and  policies 
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a, p ro -cyclical profit share, unless it is assum ed th a t  real wage grow th m atches (or exceeds) th a t  of 
labor productiv ity . T he elosed econom y can be sum m arized  in th e  following five re lationships:
I  = Jo — +  fi'U w ith  p =  (ipf n ) a  and  u  =  V / K (2 .1 )
s = -crip  =  ~ ( s n -  si j , )(ip/s)ip (2 .2 )
€ = io +  s v (2.3)
v  = I  - s (2.4)
L  = v - i (2.5)
w here ha ts  deno te  grow th ra tes. I  is investm ent, Jo represents au tonom ous investm ent or ” anim al 
sp irits ,” ip are real u n it labor costs and  V  real GDP. 0 <  a  < 1 is th e  elastic ity  of investm ent 
dem and  w ith  respect to  th e  profit share, and  0 <  (3 <  1  th e  elastic ity  of investm ent dem and  w ith  
respect to  th e  ra te  of capacity  u tiliza tio n  u = V/K.  T he s tan d a rd  K aleckian investm ent function 
im plies th a t  th e  paradox  of cost always applies, w hereas th e  version used here does no t, see B had u ri 
and  M arglin  (1990).
s is th e  aggregate saving propensity , and  follows from  th e  accounting  id en tity  th a t  saving ou t of 
wage incom e plus saving ou t of profit incom e sum  to  to ta l saving, a  >  0 is th e  e lastic ity  of saving 
w ith  respect to  th e  wage share, so th a t  th e  saving p ropensity  always falls w ith  a red is trib u tio n  of 
incom e tow ards wage earners.
£ =  V / L  is average labo r productiv ity , and  is determ ined  by a K aldor V erdoorn Law, nam ed 
afte r V erdoorn (1949) and  K aldor (1978). K aldor argued  th a t  average labor p ro d u c tiv ity  increases 
w ith  th e  expansion of m anufac tu ring  due to  increased specia lization  and  learn ing  by doing. T he 
lite ra tu re  on th e  top ic is extensive, and  generally  finds strong  su p p o rt for a positive link betw een de­
m and  grow th and  p ro d u c tiv ity  grow th. 0 <  S <  1 is th e  K aldor V erdoorn elasticity: see M cCom bie 
et al. (2003) and  references therein .
Value added  V  is determ ined  from  th e  dem and  side, and  em ploym ent L  follows given a changing  
labor in p u t coefficient l /£ .  S tric tly  speaking, only I  and  £ are d eterm ined  by behavioral func­
tions. C losure assum ptions o u tp u t is dem and  determ ined  and  labor supply  does no t constra in  
th e  econom y—com plete  th e  m odel.
2.1 Short run equilibrium
In  th e  sho rt run , K  =  K q and  K  =  0, so th a t  th e  two equations of th e  m odel can be w ritten  in 
p ro d u c tiv ity  grow th  £ and  dem and  grow th V , 1
a  — p a  — p
I p  =  io  + S V ,  (2.7)
1 I n  t h e  s h o r t  r u n ,  K  —  0  i m p l i e s  t h a t  a  h i g h e r  r a t e  o f  d e m a n d  g r o w t h  i s  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  a  h i g h e r  r a t e  o f  c a p a c i t y  
u t i l i z a t i o n .  W i t h  o n l y  g r o s s  s a v i n g s  a n d  i n v e s t m e n t  f l o w s  c o n s i d e r e d ,  i t  i m p l i e s  a s  w e l l  t h a t  n e t ,  i n v e s t m e n t  i s  z e r o .  
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w here £e d  is th e  e ffec tive  d em a n d  curve, and  represen ts a K aldor V erdoorn p ro d u c tiv ity  sched­
ule. D em and is p rofit led if cr — p < 0 , i.e. if th e  (leakage) elastic ity  of saving is sm aller th a n  the  
(injection) elastic ity  of investm ent, b o th  w ith  respect to  real u n it labo r costs. T he equilibria
=  s ip  +  (1  -  +  (a  -  p )se ,
1 -  p  +  (a  -  p )S  v 7
T>* i0 + (<r - p ) ( u  -  £0) /onN
V -  1 -1 3  + ( a -  p )S  (2 '9)
show th a t  grow th, as typ ical for m odels w ith  th is s tru c tu re , depends on tre n d  grow th  ra tes, here 
of investm ent I q, p ro d u c tiv ity  £o, and  of real wages ujo, as well as th e  relevant elasticities. T he 
equilib rium  is econom ically m eaningful if 1 — (3 +  (<r — p)S  >  0, m eaning  e ither
S > — - — — if dem and  is w age-led , (cr — p > 0, W L ) , or (2-10)
a  — p
5 < -------- — if dem and  is p ro fit-led , (cr — p <  0. P L ) . (2-11)
(j -  p
T he equilib rium  exists, if 5 /  (1 — /3)/(cr — p), an d  is s tab le  if th e  response of investm ent to  an  
increase in dem and  is sm aller th a n  th e  response of savings .2 T he m odel allows th o u g h t experim ents 
on how to  su sta in  dem and, p ro d u c tiv ity  and  em ploym ent grow th, b u t takes th e  real wage as given. 
As previously  m entioned, N aastep ad  (2006) focuses on th e  effect real wage grow th can have on 
p ro d u c tiv ity  grow th, b u t since it does no t a lte r th e  q ualita tive  featu res of th e  m odel, th is  line of 
inquiry  is no t pu rsued  h ere .3
3 A K alecki—K aldor m odel o f a closed econom y w ith  wage and  
price settin g
T he m odel of th is  section is th e  sam e as above plus wage curve and  m a rk -u p  price:
w  =  wo +  w \{ L  — n )  (3-1)
Q  =  qo +  q i{w  -  (3.2)
w here w is th e  nom inal wage, and  Q  th e  price, m arked  up  on nom inal u n it labor cost w /£  =  w L / V .  
wo and  qo are tren d  inflation  ra te s  of wages and  prices, respectively. T he wage curve (Blanchflower 
and  Oswald (1990)) im plies th a t  th e  wage level w  rises w ith  th e  ra te  of em ploym ent, L / N , given 
bargain ing  s tren g th  of workers sum m arized  in th e  e lastic ity  w \  > 0 . n  rep resen ts th e  grow th ra te
2 I n  l e v e l s ,  g 1 —  I / K  —  ( 1  — ^ ) a v ^ , a n d  g s  =  s u  —  ( .s v  — ( s w — S y } 4 ’) u ,  a n d  f o r  s t a b i l i t y  i n  t h e  g o o d s  m a r k e t  
g l  — g'y —  s  —  / f r r " * / - 1  <  0 ,  w h i c h  i s  g e n e r a l l y  s a t i s f i e d .  I n  s e c t i o n  4  a n d  s i m u l a t i o n s ,  i m p o r t s  i n c r e a s e  t h e  l e a k a g e  
e l a s t i c i t y  a n d  f u r t h e r  s t a b i l i z e  t h e  g o o d s  m a r k e t .
3 I f  p r o d u c t i v i t y  g r o w t h  s p e e d s  u p  w i t h  h i g h e r  r e a l  w a g e  g r o w t h ,  t h e  p r o d u c t i v i t y  r u l e  i s  £  —  £ o  +  7 Cj +  S V ,  a n d  
t h e  e q u i l i b r i u m  d e m a n d  g r o w t h  r a t e  b e c o m e s  V *  —  ( I q  +  ( a  —  p ) ( ( l  — 7 ) ^  — £ o ) ) / ( l  — P  +  (0 — p ) ^ ) 1 m e a n i n g  7  >  1 
r e v e r s e s  t h e  s i g n  o f  r e a l  w a g e  g r o w t h  o n  e q u i l i b r i u m  o u t p u t  g r o w t h ,  g i v e n  t h e  d e m a n d  r e g i m e  a  — p ,  s e e  N a a s t e p a d  
( 2 0 0 6 ) ,  p a g e  4 1 8 .  S i n c e  7  a p p e a r s  t o  b e  s m a l l e r  t h a n  u n i t y ,  i t  d o c s  n o t  d r a m a t i c a l l y  a l t e r  t h e  q u a l i t a t i v e  f e a t u r e s  o f  
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of th e  labor forcc N .
3.1 Price, real wage and distribution
Let us s ta r t  w ith  a couple of com m ents on th e  price Q . F irs t, it is labelled such because th e  le tte r 
P  is reserved for th e  price of to ta l supply, w hich differs from  th e  price Q  of value added  in an  open 
economy, see equation  (4.1). Second, Q  rises w ith  nom inal un it labo r costs, given th e  m ark  up 
elastic ity  0 <  q\ <  1. T he s ta n d a rd  form ulation , i.e. Q  =  (1 +  r ) w /£ , w ith  a fixed m ark -u p , fixes 
th e  profit share a t ir =  r / ( l  +  r ) ,  w hich would defeat th e  purpose of determ in ing  th e  d is trib u tio n  of 
incom e endogenously .4 Hence, th e  equ a tio n  for Q  im plies an  endogenous m ark -u p . F irs t, though , 
let us have a closer look a t nom inal u n it labor costs, inflation and  th e  real wage. N om inal un it 
labo r cost g row th is
w  — £  =  Wq — (1  +  w ’l K o  — w i n  +  i p i V ,  w ith  
-01 =  w  i — (1  +  w \)5 .
T he p a ram ete r ipi deserves close a tten tio n , since, as will be seen th ro u g h o u t th is section, the  
ch arac teris tics  of price and  d is trib u tiv e  regim e change w ith  i f j (-0 i will p lay  as well a key role 
in th e  sim ulation  exercises in scction 5.) 0 \ >  0 if w \ / ( l  +  w \)  > 5, and  vice versa, meaning- 
strong  bargain ing  and  weak p ro d u c tiv ity  effects im ply rising nom inal u n it labor costs w ith  dem and  
grow th.
Inflation, derived from  nom inal un it labor costs, is
Q  =  fj +  q i ^ i V ,  w ith
V =  qo +  q iq , and 
q =  w 0 -  (1  +  w i ) i 0 -  w i n ,
and  p artia ls  ^  >  0, > 0, ^  <  0, <  0. Since 0 <  q\ <  1, th e  sign of d Q / d V  =  qi'ipi varies 
w ith  '0 i. T he price rises w ith  ac tiv ity  (0 i >  0) if nom inal u n it labor costs rise w ith  activity. P rice 
se tting  depends on bargain ing  power of w orkers (u>i) and  th e  s tren g th  of p ro d u c tiv ity  gains (5); 
th e  im plicit assum ption  is th a t  firm s do not necessarily have sufficient pricing power in p roduc t 
m arkets to  realize profits generated  due to  un it cost savings.
T he real wage is Qj =  w  — Q , w hich becom es
Cj =  w  +  ( w i ( l  — S) — q i’ijji ) y ,  w ith  
w  =  w 0 -  w i  (^o +  ri) -  rj.
If -0i <  0, d C j/d V  0, b u t th e  to ta l effect will no t be m uch larger th a n  W \{1 — S )V ,  since 
b o th  qi and  0 1 are likely to  be sm all. O n th e  o th er hand , if ipi > 0, dC o/dV  >  0 as well, since
4 I n  t h e  s t a n d a r d  m o d e l ,  t h e  c o n s t a n t  m a r k  u p  r  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  o n l y  l i n k  b e t w e e n  d i s t r i b u t i o n  a n d  d e m a n d ,  a n d  
e x o g e n o u s  c h a n g e s  t o  t h e  m a r k  u p  a r e  t h e  o n l y  c h a n n e l  t h r o u g h  w h i c h  d i s t r i b u t i o n  c a n  h a v e  a n  c f f c c t ,  o n  d e m a n d .  
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w \  >  — • P ro  cyclical real wages arc build  into th e  m odel, b u t prices can be (weakly)
cou n ter-cy c lica l.5
N ext, th e  d is trib u tiv e  curve ip =  w  — Q  — £ is
%I =  ip +  (1 — q i) ip iV ,  w ith  (3.6)
^ = -q o  + (i -  qi)q-
d ip /d V  >  0 if ipi >  0, and  d is trib u tiv e  ad ju stm en t exhib its a profit squeeze (P S ), since real un it 
labor costs rise w ith  activ ity : w hereas d ip /d V  <  0 if ipi <  0 , and  d is trib u tiv e  ad ju stm en t exhib its 
” forced saving” (F S ), since p ro d u c tiv ity  grow th o u tru n s  real wage grow th, and  th e  profit share 
rises .6
Now, let us consider th e  m ark  up  r  m entioned  above. W ith  th e  price equa tion  Q . r  is en­
dogenous. Since Q =  (1 +  t ) w / £  a t any po in t in tim e m ust hold, r  =  qo{w/ — 1, and 
log differen tiation  gives
_ 1 
TV
% ~ (1 -  qi)q ~ (1 -  qityiV , (3.7)
w hich im plies th a t  d r / d V  >  0 if ip <  0, and  vice versa .7 To sum m arize, a profit squeeze, i.e. ip\ >  0 
and  a h igher wage share over th e  course of an  expansion, coincides w ith  a counter cyclical m a rk ­
up, and  a (weakly) pro cyclical price. Forced saving, i.e. ipi <  0 and  a h igher profit share over 
th e  course of an  expansion, coincides w ith  a p ro-cyclical m a rk -u p , and  a (weakly) coun ter-cyclical 
price. To em phasize: If ipi < 0, Q  falls w ith  an  increase of dem and  despite a rising m a rk -u p  r ,  
because per u n it nom inal costs decrease due to  strong  p ro d u c tiv ity  effects.
3 .2  S h o r t  r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m
T he two equations in ip and  V  are
i ’ED =  ——------------- - V  (3.8)
p — a  p — a
ipu =  ip +  (1 -  q i ) ^ i V ,  (3.9)
w here subscrip ts  s tan d  for E D  =  e ffec tive  d em a n d , D  =  D is tr ib u tio n  and , as above, p —a  determ ines 
th e  dem and  regim e. If p — a  > 0 , dem and  will be profit led, P L , and  w age-led , W L , otherw ise.
° S e e  M e s s i n a  e t  a l .  ( 2 0 0 9 )  f o r  a n  a n a l y s i s  o f  r e a l  w a g e  c y c l e s  i n  O E C D  c o u n t r i e s .  L e s s  u n i o n i z e d  c o u n t r i e s — i . e . ,  
t h e  U S — s h o w  c o n s i s t e n t l y  a n d  m o r e  s t r o n g l y  p r o - c y c l i c a l  r e a l  w a g e s ,  s i n c e  u n i o n s  s t a b i l i z e  e a r n i n g s .
6 S u c h  f o r c e d  s a v i n g  i n  c o m b i n a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  K a l e c k i a n  d e m a n d  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  i s  n o t  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  m a c r o e c o n o m i c  
a d j u s t m e n t  w i t h  f o r c e d  s a v i n g  u n d e r  f u l l  e m p l o y m e n t .  T h e  l a t t e r  i m p l i e s  t h a t  a t  o r  n e a r  f u l l  e m p l o y m e n t  p r i c e  
i n c r e a s e s  d i m i n i s h  r e a l  w e a l t h  a n d  i n  t u r n  c o n s u m p t i o n  a s  a s s e t  h o l d e r s  d e s i r e  t o  r e p l e n i s h  t h e i r  s a v i n g s .  I n  t h i s  c a s e  
t h e  e c o n o m y  s t i l l  o p e r a t e s  b e l o w  f u l l  c a p a c i t y ,  a n d  f o r c e d  s a v i n g  r e f e r s  t o  a  r i s i n g  p r o f i t  s h a r e  d u e  t o  p r o d u c t i v i t y  
g r o w t h  i n  e x c e s s  o f  r e a l  w a g e  g r o w t h .
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T he equilibria arc
r  = 1(1~ / )y + ^ 1/? (3 .10)1 -  (3 +  ( p -  (t)V’i
T>* =  lo ~  (P ~  ^  (3 11)
1-/? +  (,?- a ) *  ( ' )
and for th e  m odel to  m ake sense
0 1  > -------- —, if p — a  > 0, P L , and  (3-12)
p — a
01 <  if p - < r  <  0, W L . (3.13)
p - o
T his condition is v io lated  if (1) 0 i  >  0, (PS), and  p — a  < o, (W L), and  0 \ >  m eaning 
th e  dem and  curve cu ts th e  d is trib u tiv e  curve from  above, or (2 ) if 0 i <  0 , (FS), and  p  — a  >  0, 
(PL ), and  0 i  <  — m eaning  th e  dem and  curve cu ts th e  d is trib u tiv e  curve from  below. W hen 
would th is  occur? In  b o th  eases th e  slope of th e  dem and  grow th  schedule is sm all. T he slope of 
th e  dem and  grow th  schedule decreases as (3 approaches 1 from  below. T he K eynesian  stab ility  
condition, however, requires th a t  th e  response of savings to  an  increase in incom e m ust exceed the  
response of investm ent, w hich m eans th a t  [3 canno t becom e very la rge .8
4 A K alecki—Kaldor m odel o f an open  econom y w ith  wage and  
price settin g
O pening  th e  econom y to  trad e  requires several changes: P rice P  of to ta l supply  X  and  price Q  of 
value added  V  =  (1—f ) X  differ, since th e  form er includes im ports, valued a t e P f .  R eal consum ption  
is nom inal afte r saving incom e (1  — s ) Q V  deflated by P .  w hich m eans th a t  th e  price ra tio  Q / P  
enters th e  m ultip lier. A ssum ing th a t  all tra d e  passes th ro u g h  dom estic firms, th e  m ultip lier includes 
as well th e  im port propensity . T he dem and  curve has to  reflect these changes.
F irs t, let us consider prices. As m entioned, Q , e P f ,  and  P  now differ, e is th e  dom estic currency 
price of one un it of foreign currency: in all of th e  following, P f  =  1 for brevity. T he wage curve and 
Q  are as above, b u t th e  profit ra te  becom es r  =  (1 — i p ) ( Q / P ) u .  P  averages Q  and  e, w eighted by 
th e  im port p ropensity  f .  and  its grow th  ra te  is P  =  (1 — f ) Q  +  f e .  T he crucial assum ption  here is 
th a t  firm s m a rk -u p  on dom estic costs, b u t, given th e  im port p ropensity  / ,  pass on ex tern a l costs 
w ith o u t a fu rth e r pricing decision. A fter su b s titu tin g , P  is
P  =  ( l - f ) r }  +  f e  +  ( l - f ) q l i , l V  (4.1)
w ith  Jj = qo +  qi q  as above, and p artia ls  f j ;  >  0, $ £  >  0, <  0, f £  <  0, >  0. T he sign of 
d P / d V  =  (1 — / ) # i 0 i  depends 011 0 i .  Like in th e  previous section, price and  m ark  up  behavior
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and  d is trib u tiv e  ad ju stm en t hinge on th e  relative m agn itude  of th e  bargain ing  elastic ity  w \  and 
th e  K aldor V erdoorn elastic ity  5. P  reflects th a t , depending  on th e  share of dom estic con ten t in 
to ta l supply, (1  — / ) .
4.1 E x p o r t s ,  i m p o r t s  a n d  t h e  m u l t i p l i e r
E x p o rt and  im port functions can be w ritten  as
M  =  f  +  X  =  <f>o — cf)i(e — P )  +  X  (4.2)
E  =  e +  X f  =  6q +  e i(e  — P )  +  X f 7 (4-3)
w here incom e elasticities of im port and  export dem and  are assum ed un itary , b u t price e lastic ititics 
of im port and  export dem and  are —(f)i and  e\ .  S im ulations and  shocks below do no t focus on 
exports  and  im ports  directly, so th a t  th e  tre n d  dem and  grow th ra te s  <fiq =  0 , eo =  0 are set to  zero.
W ith  to ta l  supply  X  =  C  +  I  +  E ,  value added  V  =  (1 — f ) X  and  real consum ption  C  =  
(1  — s ) Q V / P , th e  m ultip lier becom es m  =  and  its g row th ra te  is rh =  7j i q (Q —
P )  +  m ^il) — in f f .  w here th e  elasticities (a t u n ita ry  base year prices) are
77i f  =  / ( I  -  f ) ~ 2m  >  0, 
m g  =  — m p  =  ( 1  — s ) m  >  0 , and 
?77</, =  s m a  =  rri(sn — s^) ip  >  0 .
A fter su b s titu tin g  th e  grow th  ra te  of th e  im port p ropensity  / ,  /  =  — 4>\{e — P ) ,  th e  grow th ra te  of 
th e  m ultip lier becom es
777 =  777q Q  +  777,/,0 +  777/016 -  (niQ  +  ?77/0i)P . (4.4)
T he m ultip lier increases w ith  value added  prices Q , since it im plies a rise in real incom e Q V / P , 
and  increases w ith  -0, since wage earners have a h igher p ropensity  to  consum e. T he m ultip lier 
decreases w ith  supply  price P ,  since it im plies a fall in real incom e ,9 and  decreases in th e  im port 
p ropensity  / .  /  is a decreasing function  of e / P ,  m eaning a nom inal devaluation  decreases im ports, 
and  increases th e  m ultip lier, w hereas dom estic price increases increase im ports, hence decrease the  
m ultip lier. T he in tro d u ctio n  of im port costs brings prices to  th e  fore. N ext to  th e  wage share 0, 
prices Q  and  P  as well as th e  nom inal exchange ra te  e im pact th e  m ultip lier. T he open econom y 
resu lts can differ s ta rk ly  from  th e  closed econom y results. To see how, we have to  take up  effective 
dem and.
4.2 E f f e c t iv e  d e m a n d  a n d  s h o r t  r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m
T he effective dem and  curve now includes ex ternal dem and, V  =  m  +  \  /  +  (1  — \ ) E  w ith  \  =  m l / V  
th e  m ultip lier ad ju sted  share of investm ent in GDP. A fter some algebra th e  effective dem and
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schedule can be w ritten  as
y  =  K v - e ) + x i o  +  { l - x ) X f  rn4, X P
1  -  Xqi’ipi -  x fi 1 -  ~  XP ' '
T he slope coefficient’s denom inato r 1  — Xq\ipi — x P  is positive for reasonable p aram ete r values. T his 
will be tru e  even if A gi^i is positive, since th is  p ro d u c t will be small; see th e  discussion fu rth e r 
below. Hence, th e  sign of th e  slope coefficient hinges on th e  num era to r. D em and is profit led if 
rn,/, — XP <  0, and  vice versa. T he difference m,/, — Xp  plays a cen tra l role in th e  sim ulation  exercises 
of section 5. A no ther crucial p a ram ete r is A:
A =  frriQ  -  (1 -  ,/') [m /0 i +  (1 -  x ) e i ] , (4.6)
w ith  p artia ls  <  0, <  0, <  0 as well as <  0, b u t >  0. In words, th e  m ore open
th e  economy, m eaning th e  h igher /  and  1  — %, th e  sm aller (and m ore likely negative) is A. A nd, the  
m ore flex ib le  th e  economy, m eaning  th e  h igher e\ and  <pi, th e  sm aller (and m ore likely negative) 
is A. How can th is  p a ram ete r be in te rp re ted ?  F irs t, A is akin to  a M arsh a ll-L ern er condition. A 
nom inal devalua tion  e >  0 is expansionary  if A <  0, m eaning  th e  sum  of th e  (weighted) im port and  
export price elasticities ct>i and  €\ has to  be larger th a n  th e  elastic ity  of th e  m ultip lier w ith  respect 
to  value added  price Q , (1 — f ) ( r r i f ( p 1 +  (1 — x ) ei) >  f m Q-
However, trad e  effects shift th e  ED curve as well th ro u g h  inflation and  p ro d u c tiv ity  trends. 
If A <  0, <  0, <  0, >  0, ^  >  0, and  vice versa. Essentially, if th e  econom y responds 
strongly  to  changes in ex tern a l com petitiveness and  A <  0, wage policies have co n trac tio n ary  cffccts 
th a t  em phasize— if profit led— or lim it and  possibly reverse— if w age-led— th e  endogenous cffccts 
of d is trib u tio n a l changes on d em an d .10 Since A has these im p o rtan t effects, it jo ins rn ^  — x p  and 
ipi in th e  set of p aram ete rs  m ost im p o rtan t for sim ulation  exercises below.
Now, to  gauge th e  to ta l effect, let us consider th e  short ru n  equilibrium :
■ *^ =  x l o  +  (1 -  x ) X f  +  A(77 -  e) -  ( x p  -  rri^yip
1 -  XP  +  (XP ~  m 4> -  '
^  =  (1  -  Xqi'ipi -  xP)' ip +  K v  -  e)ipi
1 -  x P  + (x p  -  rrH ~  ' '
For th e  m odel to  be econom ically m eaningful,
ip 1 > ---------- -— — , if XP > rrH>• F*L. and  (4.9)
XP ~  ^
1  — Xqiipi — x P  ^  WT (A inN-01 < --------------------------, if \ p  < 7n,h  W L . (4.10)
XP -  " h .
1 0 I n  B l c c k c r  ( 1 9 8 9 ) ,  t h e  r a t e  o f  a c c u m u l a t i o n  o f  a n  o p e n  e c o n o m y  c a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  r e s p o n s e  t o  a  l o w e r  m a r k  u p  
i f  t h e  e c o n o m y  i s  r e l a t i v e l y  c l o s e d ,  a n d  t r a d e  e l a s t i c i t i e s  a r e  r e l a t i v e l y  s m a l l ;  t h e  r a t e  o f  a c c u m u l a t i o n  d e c r e a s e s  i n  
r e s p o n s e  t o  a  l o w e r  m a r k - u p  i f  t h e  e c o n o m y  i s  r e l a t i v e l y  o p e n .  W h i l e  t h e  m o d e l s  d i f f e r ,  t h e  k e y  r e s u l t  i s  t h e  s a m e :  
T h e  m o r e  o p e n  t h e  e c o n o m y ,  a n d  t h e  l a r g e r  t h e  t r a d e  e l a s t i c i t i e s ,  t h e  m o r e  d o c s  g r o w t h  o f  d e m a n d  t e n d  t o  r e s p o n d  
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W h a t is th e  equilib rium  dem and grow th ra te  response to  a shock? N ote th a t  th e  expression for 
V*  includes r) and  0 , b o th  of w hich are p aram ete rs  th a t  include tre n d  grow th ra tes. Recall from 
above Tj =  qo +  q \q , and  ip =  —qo +  (1  — q \)q  w here q =  wq — (1  +  w i)£o — w \n , so th a t  w riting  
9 =  nip, — x p  and  sim plifying gives X(jj  — e) +  (nip, — x p ) ,lP =  (A — $) Qo +  (<7iA +  (1 — Qi)@) Q ~  Ae. 
T he equilib rium  dem and  grow th  ra te  can th en  be w ritten  as
y *  _  X h  +  (1 ~  x ) X f  +  (A — 9) go +  (q\X +  (1 — qi )9)  q — Ae ^
1 -  XP +  (XP ~  rrH’ ~  ?iA )'0i ’ ’
W ith  a positive denom inato r, th e  sign of th e  response of V*  to  shocks to  qo depends on A — 9, and 
to  wo, ^0: n  011 th e  qi w eighted average of A and  9. T he following section takes a closer look a t th is  
condition, based  on th e  arguab ly  m ost in teresting  question  w hat effect a policy induced  increase of 
tuo would have.
4 .3  W a g e  p o l i c y
W ith  A <  0, th e  dem and  curve 0 e d  (equation  (4.5)) shifts left w ith  qo >  0, wq >  0 and  shifts 
righ t w ith  e > 0,£o >  0, n  >  0. B u t how docs th e  equ librium  dem and  grow th  ra te  (equation
(4.11)) respond  to  an  increase in th e  nom inal wage ra te?  From  equa tion  (4.11), d V * / d w o  >  0 if 
qiX  +  (1  — — XP)  >  0- Since A <  0, th is  im plies th a t  th e  equilib rium  dem and  grow th  ra te  
increases w ith  a nom inal wage increase if ( xP ~  rn '<p) / A >  9i / ( l  — Qi)- Now, p ro f it-  and  wage led 
dem and  regim es have to  be considered separately.
1. A <  0 and  9 =  (rn,p — x p ) < 0 (P L ): d V * / d w 0 > 0 if (x.P ~  m ^ ) / X  >  g i / ( l  — qi) .
T he righ t h and  side of th e  inequality  above is positive, q i / ( l  — qi )  >  0. T he left h an d  side is 
negative; th e  condition  is alw ays v io lated , and  equilib rium  dem and  grow th  alw ays responds 
negatively  to  a nom inal wage increase.
2. A <  0 and  9 =  (m,/, — x p ) >  0 (W L ): d V * / d w o  >  0 if ( x p  — m ^ , ) / X  > q i / ( l  — qi) .
As in th e  previous case, th e  righ t h an d  side is positive. In  co n trast to  th e  previous case, the  
left h an d  side is positive as well. Hence, th e  condition  can be satisfied, if rn.tp x p ,  a n d /o r  
A is sm.all, a n d /o r  q\ is sm.all, w hich im plies th a t  '(Pe d  has to  be fairly responsive (flat) to  
d istrib u tiv e  changes. T he equilib rium  dem and  grow th  ra te  increases in response to  a nom inal 
wage increase if A is sm all or th e  d is trib u tiv e  response is large; sec F igure 1 and  th e  following 
discussion.
W ith  A >  0, if')e d  shifts righ t w ith  qo >  (J, t&o >  0 and  shifts left w ith  e >  0,£o >  (J, n  >  0. How 
does equilibrium  dem and  grow th  respond  to  an  increase in th e  nom inal wage ra te?  From  equation
(4.11), d V * / d w o  > 0 if giA +  (1  — q \ — x p )  >  0. Since A >  0 , th is im plies th a t  th e  equilibrium  
dem and grow th  ra te  increases w ith  a nom inal wage increase if ( x p  ~  rn4>)/A <  <?i/(l — qi)- Again, 
profit and  wage led dem and  regim es have to  be considered separately :
1. A >  0 and  9 =  (nip, — XP) < 0 (P L ): d V * / d w 0 > 0 if <?i/(l -  q\)  >  ( x p  ~  rn.tp) /X.
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satisfied, if q\ 0, a n d /o r  A 0. a n d /o r  xp ~  m’>.b is small. In  o th er words, th e  dem and  curve 
has to  be fairly unresponsive (steep) to  d is trib u tiv e  changes. E quilib rium  dem and  grow th 
increases in response to  a wage increase if A is large and  th e  d istrib u tiv e  response is weak; 
see as well F igure 2 and  th e  following discussion.
2. A >  0 and  9 =  (rn,j, — xp) > 0 (W L ): d V * / d w Q  >  0 if g i / ( l  — qi)  > (xp ~  m (p ) / A.
T he left h an d  side is positive, b u t th e  righ t h and  side is negative: T he condition is always 
satisfied, since q\/{l — q\) >  0, and  {xp~mi’) / A <  0. If dem and  is w age-led  and  th e  econom y 
is relatively  closed to  trad e , wage policies arc effective in spurring  dem and.
W age policy can be successful, in th e  sense th a t  it im proves econom ic perform ance, if dem and  is 
strongly  w age-led  and  A <  0 is sm all, or if dem and  is only weakly profit led, and  A 0 is large. 
W age policy canno t be successful, if A <  0 and  dem and  is profit led, and  is always successful, if 
A >  0 and  dem and is wage led.
F igure 1 and  2 highlight th e  issue. In  F igure 1, i/jjj rep resen ts a d is trib u tiv e  curve w ith  forced 
saving, and  a w age-led  dem and  curve. All tre n d  grow th  ra te s  are assum ed to  be zero, so th a t  
th e  two curves cross a t th e  origin, po in t A. A shock to  Wq >  0 shifts th e  d istrib u tiv e  curve upw ards, 
and, if A <  0 , shifts (con tracts) th e  dem and  curve leftw ard. W h e th e r th e  new equilib rium  dem and  
grow th  ra te  is sm aller (point B) or larger (point C) th a n  zero, depends on th e  relative size of A 
and  th e  slope of th e  dem and  curve. In  F igure 2, i/jjj represen ts a d istrib u tiv e  curve w ith  a profit 
squeeze, and  i!j 1ed  a profit-led dem and  curve. W ith  tre n d  grow th  ra te s  assum ed to  be zero th e  two 
curves cross a t th e  origin, po in t A. T he wage policy shifts th e  d istrib u tiv e  curve upw ards, and, 
if A >  0, shifts th e  dem and  curve outw ard . A gain, w he ther th e  new equilib rium  dem and  grow th 
ra te  is sm aller (point B) or larger (point C), depends on th e  re la tive size of A and  th e  slope of th e  
dem and  curve.
5 C alibration(s) and sim ulation(s)
How do these m any and  possibly sm all shifts in p aram ete r regim es im pact overall m odel resu lts?  
T his question  is tak en  up  in th is section, w hich presen ts random ized  calib ra tions and  a variety  of 
sim u la tions .11
5 .1  C a l i b r a t i o n ( s )
It is com m on p ractice to  use a base year d a ta  set and  elastic ity  values to  ca lib ra te  a varie ty  of 
p a ram e te rs .12 For an  illu stra tive  exam ple, le t's  have a look a t th e  investm ent function. Suppose
" T h e  m o d e l  o f  t h e  p r e v i o u s  s e c t i o n  h a s  b e e n  p r e s e n t e d  i n  g r o w t h  r a t e s ,  b e c a u s e  i t  e n a b l e d  a  s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  
a n a l y s i s  o f  e q u i l i b r i a ,  c o m p o s i t e  e l a s t i c i t i e s  a n d  t h e  i m p a c t  o f  s h o c k s .  C a l i b r a t i o n  a n d  s i m u l a t i o n  p r o c e d u r e  a r c  r u n  
i n  l e v e l s .  N e a r  t h e  e q u i l i b r i u m ,  t h e  l i n e a r i z e d  v e r s i o n  d e s c r i b e s  t h e  m o d e l ’s  b e h a v i o r  r e a s o n a b l y  w e l l ;  c a l i b r a t i n g  a n d  
s i m u l a t i n g  t h e  m o d e l  i n  l e v e l s  d o e s  s h o w  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  t h e  s a m e  b e h a v i o r  a s  t h e  m o d e l  a b o v e  a s  l o n g  a s  t h e  s h o c k s  
c o n s i d e r e d  a r e  n o t  l a r g e .
1 2 T h e  b a s e  y e a r  i s  d e r i v e d  f r o m  N I P A - t a b l e s ,  B u r e a u  o f  E c o n o m i c  A n a l y s i s  ( B E A )  d a t a  f o r  t h e  U S  e c o n o m y ,  i n  
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one can deduce a reasonable p rior from  available econom etric evidence for th e  two elasticities, a  
and /3. Investm ent I  and  th e  ra te  of capacity  u tiliza tio n  u =  V /K  arc given from th e  base year 
d a ta , allowing to  solve for Jo- T hus, th e  key to  ca lib ra tion  is to  recognize th a t  for each equation  
th e  base year value of th e  endogenous variable is known, hence th e  re la tionsh ip  can be used to  
determ ine one param eter.
It m ight be necessary to  ca lib ra te  two p aram ete rs  in a single re la tionsh ip . For exam ple, the  
gross m acroeconom ic p ropensity  to  save is a function  of a d is trib u tiv e  variable. B oth  th e  aggregate 
p ropensity  s and  th e  wage share ip arc known from  th e  base year d a ta , leaving two p aram eters , 
sn and  s,f,, to  be determ ined . S etting  sn — s.tp =  s ', w ith  0 <  s ' <  1 gives th e  second degree of 
freedom , in effect defining how m uch larger th e  p ropensity  to  save ou t of profit incom e is th a n  th e  
p ropensity  to  save ou t of wage income.
Obviously, such a ca lib ra tion  exercisc leaves considerable leeway to  th e  m odeler to  determ ine the  
p a rticu la r m an ifesta tion  of functions. Po in t estim ates for e lastic ity  values sim ply do no t converge, 
however often d a ta  sets, m ethods and  procedures arc u p d a ted  and  extended . Using elasticities from 
o th er studies is p rone w ith  difficulties, since th ey  depend  011 th e  underly ing  m odel, its assum ptions 
as well as th e  d a ta  set used. For th a t  reason, one can go a step  fu rth e r and  random ize th e  cali­
b ra tio n  procedure. Principally , for each equation  elasticities are draw n from a uniform  probab ility  
d is trib u tio n  w ith  su itab le  boundaries and  fitted  to  th e  base year d a ta  by calcu lating  th e  app ro ­
p ria te  in tercep ts. Specifically, m ean  and  variance for th e  uniform  probab ility  d is trib u tio n s  of a 
random ized  p a ram ete r p  can  be w ritten  as
n r ,  [(1 -  x ) m  +  ( 1  +  x ) m]
E \p ] =  ---------------------------------  =  m , and  (5.1)
w here x  >  0 ind icates th e  range of th e  d is trib u tio n . T he m eans m  arc chosen given p rior evidence 
discussed below.
How to  chose x?  I t w ould be desirable to  lim it dispersion, for a num ber of reasons. F irs t, in the  
best of all worlds, po in t estim ates serve as an  accep tab le  prior, around  w hich ’’tru e ” p aram eters  
m ight fall w ith  a lim ited  degree of uncertain ty . Second, increasing d ispersion washes ou t discernible 
resu lts by fla tten ing  th e  resu lting  d istribu tions. T h ird , in M onte C arlo exercises I shift th e  m eans m , 
while m ain ta in ing  x , in o rder to  assess m odel sensitiv ity  to  possible changes to  th e  prior. However, 
as will be seen in th e  next parag rap h s, su b s tan tia l u n ce rta in ty  m ight require larger d ispersion for 
a t least some elasticities. I set x  =  0.3 for m ost. Let us briefly look a t a p a r ticu la r param eter. 
Suppose th a t  for a ,  th e  cost elastic ity  of investm ent, m  =  0.40, so th a t  th e  lower b o und  of E[a]  is 
equal to  a L =  0.70(0.40) =  0.28, and  th e  u p p er bound  is a H =  1.30(0.40) =  0.52. F u rth er, variance 
V a r[a \ =  0.0048, and  s tan d a rd  dev iation  ^ V a r [ a ]  =  0.069.
How to  chose th e  m eans m  for all re levant p aram eters?  Clearly, th is  is an  a rea  fraugh t w ith  
difficulties, so th e  p re lim inary  disclaim er includes th a t  I will try  to  ou tline weaknesses w here pos­
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th e  specific em pirical results.
T h a t said, a num ber of stud ies have investigated  th e  links betw een dem and  and  d is trib u tio n . 
One challenge in com paring and  applying any of these resu lts is th a t  some rest on cyclical full - 
econom y m odels, while o thers are single equation  regressions. B arbosa-F ilho  and  Taylor (2007) 
es tim ate  a s tru c tu ra l G oodw in m odel, finding a steep  and  profit led dem and curve. Similarly, 
P ro an o  (2008) finds negative feedback from  u n it labor costs to  econom ic ac tiv ity  for th e  US, E U - 
area, and  selected large EU  economies. N aastep ad  (2006) finds a significant im pact of d istrib u tiv e  
changes on investm ent. R ad a  and  Taylor (2006) suggest sim ilar num bers. G ordon (1996) finds a 
significant re la tion  betw een d is trib u tio n  and  dem and, and  th e  US to  be profit led. Hein and  Vogel 
(2008) discuss lite ra tu re  of single equation  estim ations th a t  often  com m end dem and  in developed 
economies to  be wage led. M ore open econom ies on th e  one h and  and  th e  U nited  S ta tes on th e  o th er 
h an d  ap p ear m ore often to  be profit led. T heir own estim ations confirm  th a t  em pirical evidence on 
th e  n a tu re  of th e  dem and  regim e is often  conflicting and  depends on m odel and  es tim atio n  priors. 
T here are o th er reasons th a t  feed u n ce rta in ty  ab o u t th e  size of th is  elasticity. I.e., th e  increasing 
use of profits for financial investm ents and  share buybacks m ight render profits itself an  inadequate  
proxy of in terna l finance available for investm ent. Here, I will assum e th a t  th e  d is trib u tiv e  elasticity  
of investm ent (a ) is positive and  significant, m eaning th a t  h igher u n it labo r costs lead to  lower 
investm ent. N aastep ad  (2006) estim ates a  =  0.39 for th e  N etherlands, w hich could arguab ly  be 
h igher for th e  US. P ro an o  (2008) (and  re la ted  lite ra tu re ) do no t estim ate  sep a ra te  investm ent 
functions, b u t in stead  an  IS -cu rve for capacity  u tiliza tio n  th a t  depends on a d is trib u tiv e  variable. 
T heir estim ates can be read  as confirm ation of th a t  general range, leading me to  adop t a  =  0.40.
T h e  slope of th e  d istrib u tiv e  curve is no t less controversial. Here, too , th e  devil is in th e  detail. 
For exam ple, S torm  and  N aastep ad  (2007) find th a t  th e  profit share is pro cyclical. Indeed, a 
glance a t  a plot of th e  (US) business cycle to g eth er w ith  co rp o ra te  profits re la tive to  G D P strongly  
suggests a pro  cyclical profit share. However, in a cyclical m odel th e  profit share can rise over the  
early  p a r t of an  expansion. W ith  strong  bargain ing  and  th e  ap p ro p ria te  in s titu tio n s, th e  wage share 
(profit share) will ca tch  up  (fall behind) and  rise (fall) in th e  la te r stage of th e  cycle. B arbosa-F ilho  
and  Taylor (2007) find such a re la tionship . It would be consisten t w ith  profit squeeze d istribu tive  
ad ju stm en t. O th er dynam ic m odels, such as P roano  (2008), F laschel et al. (2007), and  F laschel and 
Krolzig (2006), estim ate  wage price spirals and  find (1) th e  responsiveness of wages to  pressure in 
th e  labor m arke t to  be qu ite  strong , b u t (2 ) th e  m a rk -u p  elastic ity  to  be m uch weaker— w hich would 
im ply a high w \  here, and  possibly a profit squeeze. A ccording to  P ro an o  (2008), th e  em ploym ent 
elastic ity  of wages w \  =  0.94, and  th e  m ark  up  elastic ity  q\ =  0.05 in th e  US. Since w \  near 
un ity  steers th e  ca lib ra tion  tow ards a profit-squecze, and  q\ near 0 can exclude th e  possib ility  of a 
positive im pact of wage policies if A >  0 and  dem and  is profit led, I adop t w \  =  0.75 and  q\ =  0.20 
for th e  prior, w ith  x  =  .5 for q\.
T h e aggregate savings p ropensity  is determ ined  in th e  base year d a ta , as is th e  wage share 
ip, leaving th e  two class behav io ral p aram ete rs  sn and  s.tp to  be ca lib ra ted . sn and  s.tp should be 
d isaggregated  as wage receiving households versus cap ita lis t profit receiving households. C oncep­










L 1  ^  : U n i v e r s i t y  o f  U t a h  I n s t i t u t i o n a l  R e p o s i t o r y
A u t h o r  M a n u s c r i p t
to  households who own shares, even th o u g h  th a t  would occur ou tside th e  scope of th e  m odel. It is 
less s tra igh tfo rw ard , however, w hen it comes to  real world d a ta . A su b stan tia l p a r t of m acroeco­
nom ic savings rem ains w ith in  corporations, p u rp o rted ly  to  finance investm ent (E ichner and  Kregel 
(1975)). M oreover, a su b s tan tia l p a r t of wage incom e m ight be m ore app ro p ria te ly  categorized 
w ith  profit incom e, as recent research has shown, see G ordon and  Dcw-Becker (2008) and  P ik c tty  
and  Sacz (2006). Here, I will be con ten t w ith  estim ates discussed elsewhere. N aastep ad  (2006) 
estim ates s w =  0.14, and  s n =  0.49 for N etherlands, so th a t  th e  difference tu rn s  ou t to  be ab o u t 
0.35. In  th e  US, th e  difference could  be higher. T he average (net) saving p ropensity  has been near 
0 for a while (and has only recently  s ta rted  to  rise), b u t high(er) incom e households are unlikely 
to  save as little . I am  assum ing sn — s.tp =  0.30 for th e  prior.
N ext, th e  dem and  elastic ity  [3 is less controversial, and  its m ean  is set a t 0.5. T he K a ld o r- 
V erdoorn coefficient S is usually  found to  be in th e  range betw een 0.30 and  0.60, and  I set E [5 ] =
0.45. See th e  con tribu tions and  references in M cCom bie et al. (2003) for discussion and  estim ates. 
T he price elasticities e\ and  (j)\ of exports  and  im ports  have frequently  been su b jec t to  em pirical 
testing . For th e  US, it has been argued  th a t  <pi >  1 >  ei, leading to  balance of paym ents problem s, 
see Blecker (1998). E ith er way, a t th is  level of aggregation  price elasticities of trad e  are likely not 
too  far from  unity. However, since A would not tu rn  positive w ith  tra d e  elasticities near unity, I 
allow arb itra rily  low bounds, draw ing e\ and  (j)l from  [0 .20 , 1 .00]. I will use these bounds only in 
th e  following section, w here th e  focus is to  highlight how th e  m odel works.
How do these estim ates figure in th e  theo re tica l m odel laid ou t above? L e t’s first exam ine the  
slope of th e  effective dem and  curve. Recall th e  relevant coefficient on 'ijj. U sing m eans of th e  prior 
for all behav io ral p aram ete rs  except a  and  s n — s^,. and  evaluating  a t th e  base year d a ta  gives
€  =  , fl =* €  >  0 if 1.48(«„ -  * ,)  >  -  (5.3)
d'xjj 1 — Agi^i — x(3 d i ’ %
It is im p o rtan t to  see th a t  th is  back of th e  envelope calcu lation  depends on th e  base year d a ta . 
Different in itia l conditions can lead to  different dem and regim es. B ased on elasticities previously 
discussed, th e  base year d a ta  w ith  a  =  0.40 and  (s^ — s ^ )  =  0.30 w ould render dem and  w age-led, 
w hich could, w ith  only slight changes, swing th e  o th er way. T he d is trib u tiv e  regim e is a little  easier 
to  eye-ball. W ith  w \  =  0.90 and  £i =  0.40, 0 1 >  0. However, if w \ <  1 and  £i >  0.50, d istrib u tiv e  
ad ju stm en t works against wage incom e recipients.
W h a t does it take  for A to  change sign? G iven th e  base year d a ta , A >  0 if 0.36 >  0.37ei +0.5801. 
It is easy to  see th a t  b o th  trad e  elasticities have to  be significantly sm aller th a n  un ity  for A to  be 
positive, and  for th e  effective dem and  curve to  shift righ t (expand) in response to , i.e., wage policy 
or a nom inal appreciation .
5 .2  S i m u l a t i o n s
T his section rep o rts  illu stra tive  sim ulation  results. As will becom e clear, it does no t take  large 
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sum m arizes six different ca librations, w hich were chosen based  on th e ir charac teristics in order 
to  show how different p a ram e te r regim es influence sim ulation  resu lts. T he to p  p a r t of th e  tab le  
rep o rts  th e  elasticities draw n from  uniform  p robab ility  d is trib u tio n s w ith  bounds ind icated  in square 
brackets. T h e  b o tto m  p a r t rep o rts  th e  m ost im p o rtan t com posite param eters . Row 11 shows 
9. w hich determ ines th e  dem and  regim e. T he difference shown in row 13 determ ines w hether 
d V /d q o  > 0, row 14 w hether d V / d w o  >  0. Row 18 is th e  slope of th e  effective dem and  curve, and  
its inverse is th e  slope of ipED ■ Row 19 rep o rts  th e  slope of th e  d is trib u tiv e  curve, ‘ipD ■
Before we dive in to  th e  sim ulations, recall from  th e  previous section th a t  th e  tra d e  elasticities 
e\ and  (j)\ have been set w ith  an  unrealistica lly  low b o und  of 0.20. In  th e  th ree  ca lib ra tions (2, 3 
and  4) w ith  a positive A, th e  sum  of th e  trad e  elasticities is less th a n  0.63. T he US economy, w ith  
an  im port share in p roduc tion  of roughly  20 per cent, appears open enough to  require these very  
low  tra d e  elasticities for A to  tu rn  positive. Since th is  section is supposed  to  illu s tra te  th e  m odel’s 
working, ra th e r  th a n  carry  p a rticu la r em pirical weight, I stick w ith  these low tra d e  elasticities.
T he u p p er p a r t of T able 1 m akes it clear th a t  it docs no t take large changes of elasticities to  
generate  very different m odel behavior. As an  exam ple, com pare th e  first and  second ca lib ration  
(colum n 2 and  3). B o th  are profit led, b u t ca lib ra tion  3 shows a profit squeeze and  2 forced saving. 
Im portan tly , A has th e  sam e sign, b u t row 14 changes signs. D em and grow th  in th e  m odel ca lib ra ted  
w ith  n o .2 responds negatively  to  a wage shock, w hereas dem and  grow th in th e  m odel ca lib ra ted  
w ith  no.3 responds positively to  a wage shock. T he difference betw een th e  tra d e  elasticities (row 5 
and  6) is n o t  large. Similarly, read  along rows 1 th ro u g h  8 , th e  variab ility  of any given elasticity  
from  ca lib ra tion  to  ca lib ra tion  is no t large, b u t in com bination  sm all changes sw itch th e  m odel from 
profit led (n o .l no.3) to  wage led (no.4 no .6), and  from  profit squeeze (n o .l and  no.3) to  forced 
saving (no .2 and  no.4-6).
Tables 2 and  3 sum m arize sim ulation  results; T able 2 for m odel responses to  a wage and  to  a 
p ro d u c tiv ity  shock. Let us begin  w ith  th e  d is trib u tiv e  shock in th e  u p p er p a rt, here 5 per ccnt to  
th e  in tercep t te rm  in th e  wage curve, Wq. T he real wage rises across th e  board , and  w ith  it th e  wage 
share rises; investm ent falls w ith  th e  increase in real u n it labor costs. T he profit ra te  r  falls. How 
ab o u t th e  paradox  of cost? T he increase in th e  wage share, or th e  decrease in th e  m ark  up, is too  
large to  allow th e  paradox  to  p an  out. P u t differently, consum ption  does not respond  sufficiently 
strong  to  th e  increase in real wages to  have a larger cffcct on profits th a n  th e  com bined negative 
effect of reduced investm ent and  a lower m ark  up. Essentially, g row th of GDP, w here positive, is 
too sm all.
T h e po in t, though , is th a t  th e  sign of G D P grow th varies, depend ing  on th e  sign of row 14 
in T able 1. S im ulations 2 and  6 can be draw n on to  h ighlight sub tle  differences. S im ulation  2 is 
p ro fit-led /p ro fit-sq u eeze  w ith  A >  0 and  q\X  +  (1 — q \)6  >  0. T he upw ard  shift of th e  d istrib u tiv e  
curve coincides w ith  a righ tw ard  shift of th e  dem and  curve— and th e  shift is large enough to  counter 
th e  co n tra c tio n a ry  move along ipED- S im ulation 6 , on th e  o th er hand , is wage led /fo rced  saving 
w ith  A <  0 and  q\X  +  (1 — q \)6  <  0. T he upw ard shift of th e  d is trib u tiv e  curve coincides w ith  
a le ftw ard  shift of th e  dem and curve and  th e  shift is large enough to  counter th e  exp a n sio n a ry  
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W ith  A <  0 but qiX  +  (1 — q \)6  >  0, th e  leftward, shift of th e  dem and  curve is no t large enough to  
coun ter th e  exp a n sio n a ry  move along 0 e d  ■
N ote as well th a t  inflation Q  is fairly  contained  despite s trong  real u n it labor cost increases. 
Q , however, u ltim ate ly  varies w ith  V .  and  th e  relatively  weak dem and effects lim it price pressure 
in p ro d u c t m arkets. T he sam e effect can be seen in th e  lower p a r t of T able 2, w here slightly 
stronger p ro d u c t m arke t effects lead to  some deflation. T he p ro d u c tiv ity  shock here essentially  
presen ts a m irro r im age of th e  nom inal wage shock; it is th e  sam e p a ram ete r (row 14 in T able
1) th a t  determ ines th e  outcom e. T he sign p a tte rn  of GDP, investm ent and  d is trib u tiv e  variables 
(0  and  r)  is exactly  reversed. E m ploym ent grow th  is negative across th e  board , b u t less so for 
th e  th ree  profit led calib ra tions (1 3). In  th e  term inology of R ad a  and  Taylor (2006), see page 
497, th e  dem and  regim e is n o t strong ly  enough p ro fit led to  produce em ploym ent grow th w ith  a 
p ro d u c tiv ity  shock.
T he gain in com petitiveness— th e  fall in th e  real wage and  th e  concom itan t real deprecia tion— 
leads only to  m o d era te  grow th  of net exports. If G D P grow th  is negative (2, 4 and  5), th e  trad e  
balance im proves largely due to  a fall in im ports. If G D P grow th  is positive, th e  rise in im ports  
w ith  X  >  0 balances th e  positive effects of in te rn a tio n a l price changes.
N ext, th e  up p er p a r t of Table 3 sum m arizes m odel responses to  a dem and  shock, here 5 per cent 
increase of au tonom ous investm ent I q. C olum n 1 in T able 3 rep o rts  sim ulation  resu lts w ith  a p ro fit-  
led /p ro fit squeeze (P S /P L ) ca lib ra tion  w ith  A <  0. C olum n 4 in T able 2 rep o rts  sim ulation  resu lts 
w ith  a ca lib ra tion  m ore friendly to  workers, since dem and is wage led and  A is positive, m eaning 
wage policies are always successful. Still, p ro d u c tiv ity  gains are so strong  th a t  no t cap ita lis ts  b u t 
workers are squeezed during  th e  u p tu rn  w hich tu rn s  ou t to  be th e  m ain  difference. T he wage share 
falls by 0.41 per cent w ith  forced saving, and  rises by 0.06 per cent w ith  profit squeeze: p ropensity  
to  save (and  m ultip lier) change w ith  th e  d is trib u tio n  of incom e. Investm ent rises slightly  stronger 
w ith  forced saving, since real u n it labo r costs continue to  fall. T he headline num bers, however, do 
no t show significant differences.
A nom inal depreciation , finally, is again  a m ore m ixed bag. F irs t, recall th a t  a nom inal depre­
ciation is expansionary  if A <  0. Accordingly, sim ulation  1, 5 and  6 show positive grow th of GDP. 
T he in te rn a tio n a l price effects are large relative to  incom e effects, and  net exports  increase across 
all six sim ulations. Im p o rted  inflation (P ) is contained: it does not exceed 1 p er cent in th e  six 
sim ulations. (In o rder to  save space, P  has no t been rep o rted .)
These sim ulations show how th e  m odel hangs together, and , crucially, illu s tra te  how sm all p a ­
ram ete r changes lead to  very different outcom es. To fu rth e r em phasize th is  po in t, tra d e  elasticities 
were draw n from  d is trib u tio n s  w ith  unrealistic  lower bounds. T he next section fixes th is , in M onte 
C arlo sim ulations.
6 M onte Carlo
How do a large num ber of ca lib ra tions look on average? How successful can  wage policy be on 
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is, sim ply p u t, a  rep ea ted  evaluation  of a function  w ith  a t least one random  variable or p a ram eter. 
T he resu lting  d a ta  can be analyzed graphically  e ith er by p lo ttin g  a h istogram , or sm ooth ing  the  
corners of a h istog ram  th ro u g h  a K ernel D ensity  E stim a tio n  (K D E) procedure. K D E  generates a 
continuous p robab ility  function, w hich can be in teg ra ted  to  evaluate  p robab ility  m ass below and 
above zero. W ith  a norm al K ernel th e  density  function  is
1 /—  i ( x ~Pi\ 2
m  =  ^ E ^ exp h ■ (6-1)
i
w here pi arc th e  i elem ents of th e  d is trib u tio n  generated  by n  draw s of th e  expression under 
consideration , i.e. th e  slope coefficient of effective dem and  grow th, h  represen ts th e  b an d w id th — 
th e  bin w id th  for th e  h istog ram — w hich determ ines th e  sm oothness of th e  resu lting  d is tr ib u tio n .13
For th e  following exercises, th e  trad e  elasticities are reset to  a m ore realistic range. M eans 
are now set to  0.7, w hich is arguab ly  still low b u t large enough to  render A negative in all 500 
ite ra tions. T he question  will be w hether A is large enough relative to  th e  slope of a wage led 
dem and curve to  m ake wage policy alw ays have a negative effect on grow th.
F irs t, let us look a t th e  slope of effective dem and  and  d is trib u tiv e  curve. How sensitive are th e  
links betw een dem and  and  d is trib u tio n  (the p a r tia l derivatives of th e  log-d ifferen tia ted  dem and 
and  d is trib u tiv e  functions, dV/d' l j j  and  <)r <)\ ) to  carefully defined changes in p a ram e te r regim es? 
Thus, using th e  previously  discussed ca lib ra tion  in p u t set as a benchm ark , m eans m  of relevant 
elasticities are shifted, p a ram ete rs  calcu lated  n  tim es, and  resu lting  d is trib u tio n s  com pared. From  
previous sections it is clear th a t  changes of e ither a  or th e  savings differential s n — s.,/, have th e  
opposite  effect.14 Sim ilarly, w \  and  5 have opposite effects on th e  slope coefficient of th e  d istrib u tiv e  
curve. To save space, I focus on one p a ram ete r for e ither function, nam ely th e  cost elastic ity  of 
investm ent a  and  th e  bargain ing  elastic ity  w \.
Figures 3 shows th e  resu lting  d istribu tions; th e  left panel for th e  d is trib u tiv e  curve. w \  is 
d raw n from  different uniform  probab ility  d istribu tions: T he black line shows th e  prior, as rep o rted  
in Table 1. T he d o tted  line shows a dow nw ard shift of w \  to  [.34, .64], and  th e  dashed  line an  
upw ard  shift of w \  to  [.7,1.3]. B ounds of all o th er elasticities arc unchanged  from  th e  prior, sec 
Table 1. A decrease in th e  bargain ing  elastic ity  has a strongly  negative effect, w hereas a fu rth e r 
increase in w \  ra th e r fla ttens th a n  shifts th e  d is trib u tio n . C rucially, though , th e  figure suggests 
th a t  it is no t surprising  th a t  research  has found po in t estim ates in th e  left and  in th e  righ t ha lf of 
these d istribu tions.
T he righ t panel of F igure 3 shows p robab ility  d is trib u tio n s from  rep ea ted  calcu lations of the
13 I t  i s  w e l l  k n o w n  t h a t  ( 1 )  t h e  c h o i c e  o f  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  K e r n e l  h a s  o n l y  m a r g i n a l  e f f e c t  o n  s h a p e  a n d  l o c a t i o n  o f  
r e s u l t i n g  d i s t r i b u t i o n s ,  a n d  t h a t  ( 2 )  t h e  s m o o t h i n g  p a r a m e t e r  h  t e n d s  t o  b e  b e s t  c h o s e n  s u b j e c t i v e l y ,  d e s p i t e  r u l e s  o f  
t h u m b .  T h e  b a n d w i d t h  a p p l i e d  h e r e  i s  ’’ a p p r o x i m a t e l y  S i l v e r m a n . ”  S e e  G r e e n e  ( 2 0 0 7 ) ,  p a g e s  4 1 4 - 4 1 6 ,  f o r  a  s t a n d a r d  
d i s c u s s i o n .
1 4 S e c t i o n  5 . 1  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  c o n s i d e r a b l e  u n c e r t a i n t y  a b o u t  t h e  m a g n i t u d e  o f  a  a n d  s n  — s , p . I f  b o t h  ’’ t r u e ” 
p a r a m e t e r s  w e r e  t o  b e  f o u n d  i n  o p p o s i t e  t a i l  e n d s  o f  t h e  r e s p e c t i v e  d i s t r i b u t i o n s ,  d i s t r i b u t i v e  l i n k s  c o u l d  b e  s t r o n g e r  
t h a n  s u g g e s t e d  b y  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  a n a l y s i s ;  i . e . ,  i f  a  w e r e  t o  l i e  i n  t h e  f a r  l e f t  a n d  sw — Sy, i n  t h e  f a r  r i g h t  o f  t h e  r e s p e c t i v e  










L 1  ^  : : U n i v e r s i t y  o f  U t a h  I n s t i t u t i o n a l  R e p o s i t o r y
A u t h o r  M a n u s c r i p t
slope of th e  (log-differentiated) effective dem and  curve, w ith  a  d raw n from  different uniform  p rob­
ability  d istribu tions: T he black line shows th e  prior, as rep o rted  in T able 1. T he d o tted  line shows 
a dow nw ard shift of a  to  [.18, .33], and  th e  dashed  line an  upw ard  shift of a  to  [.38, .7]. B ounds 
of all o th er elasticities are unchanged from  th e  prior, see T able 1. T h e  p ic tu re  confirm s th a t  a 
K aleckian econom y will ten d  to  be wage led.
It is stra igh tfo rw ard  to  ex tend  th e  procedure  underly ing  F igure 3 to  investigate full m odel 
responses to  shocks. F irs t, define bounds of key elasticities to  ca lib ra te  th e  full m odel n  tim es. 
Second, shock th e  m odel as in th e  exam ples discussed in deta il above. T h ird , ca lcu late  n  sets of 
results. F ourth , shift bounds of key elasticities exactly  as in th e  previous parag rap h s. R inse and 
rep ea t for th e  rest. Such exercises obviously furn ish  large sets of d a ta  th e  sam ple size n  tim es the  
num ber of equations tim es th e  num ber of different ca lib ra tion  in p u t sets. W hich  s ta tis tic s  should 
be considered? G iven th a t  th e  discussion is focused on 0  an d  V ,  I will focus on ( 1 ) th e  d istrib u tiv e  
response to  a dem and  shock, and  (2) on dem and  grow th in response to  a d is trib u tiv e  shock. In 
o th er words, th e  sim ulation  considers cross effects, th a t  is, from  a dem and  shock (Jo) v ia different 
d is trib u tiv e  calib ra tions to  th e  wage share, and  from  a d is trib u tiv e  shock (wo)  via different dem and 
calib ra tions to  GDP.
F igure 4 shows results. T he left panel shows p robab ility  d is trib u tio n s of wage share grow th in 
response to  dem and  ”policy,” th e  righ t panel p robab ility  d is trib u tio n s  of G D P grow th to  ’’wage 
policy.” T he black line shows m odel responses under th e  ca lib ra tion  prior, as rep o rted  in Table
1. D o tted  line and  dashed  line represen t m odel responses to  th e  sam e shock(s), w ith  calib rations 
changed as described above (see F igure 3). L ocation  and  shape of th e  d is trib u tio n s  of th e  left panel 
arc consisten t w ith  location and  shape of th e  d is trib u tio n s  of th e  slope coefficient of th e  d istribu tive  
curve, see th e  left panel of F igure 3. T he d is trib u tio n s in th e  righ t panel, however, differ. All th ree  
d is trib u tio n s  are shifted  leftw ards, and  G D P grow th  is, on average, negative, desp ite  dem and, on 
average, being wage led A can be qu ite  im p o rtan t.
F igure 5 shows a com bination  of ” policies,” here an  increase of p ro d u c tiv ity  and  nom inal wages. 
Recall from T able 2 and  th e  discussion above th a t  a p ro d u c tiv ity  shock can be expansionary, 
and  certa in ly  increases investm ent, b u t has strong  adverse d istrib u tiv e  effects. T he com bination  
am eliorates th e  negative ex tern a l effects, w hich cause th e  leftw ard shift of d is trib u tio n s  showing 
G D P grow th in th e  righ t panel of F igure 4: b u t d is trib u tiv e  effects are on balance still negative.
7 C onclusions
T he focus of th is  p ap er is an  investigation  of a sm all b u t com prehensive P ost K eynesian m odel of 
th e  real side, w ith  p a rticu la r em phasis on ca lib ra tion  and  th e  im pact th ereo f on m odel behavior. 
Endogenous prices and  wages tu rn  ou t to  be crucial for m odel outcom es in th e  open econom y 
version of th e  m odel. D istinguish ing  betw een a m ark  up  on dom estic variable cost and  th e  supply 
price of o u tp u t, w hich includes im p o rt costs, b rings th e  price ra tio  of Q  and  P  in th e  m ultip lier 
and  th e rew ith  th e  dem and  curve. Specifically, shocks to  a price or th e  wage ra te  shift no t only 
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th e  base year d a ta , p articu la rly  m ultip lier and  tra d e  elasticities, b u t ten d s to  be adverse from  the  
perspective of wage incom e recipients.
W h e th e r th is  adverse effect outw eighs th e  positive im pact of red is trib u tio n  under a wage led 
dem and regim e depends on elasticities and  slopes, and  can easily go e ither way. T he key p aram eters  
are ( 1 ) rn.tp — \ p ,  w hich determ ines th e  dem and  regim e as e ith er profit led ( —) or wage led (+ ) , 
(2 ) '0 i, w hich determ ines th e  d is trib u tiv e  regim e as e ith er profit squeeze (+ ) or forced saving (—) 
and  (3) A, w hich determ ines th e  sign and  m agn itude  of a dem and  sh ift  in response to , i.e., a 
wage increase. R elative size and  in terac tio n  of (1) an d  (3) determ ine th e  to ta l cffcct of a wage 
increase on dem and, and  th e  analysis su p p o rts  th e  claim  th a t  ex ternal libera liza tion  lim its space 
for red is trib u tiv e  policy th a t  is sim ultaneously  geared tow ards dem and  expansion.
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Figure 1: xpj, represents a distributive curve with forced saving, and xpgD a wage-led demand curve. All trend growth rates are 
assumed to be zero, so that the two curves cross at the origin, point A. A shock to w0 > 0 shifts the distributive curve upwards, 
and, if A < 0, shifts the demand curve leftward. Whether the new steady state demand growth rate is smaller (point B) or 
larger (point C), depends on the relative size of A and the slope of the demand curve.
Figure 2: In this figure, xp} represents a distributive curve with a profit squeeze, and $ \ D a profit-led demand curve. All trend 
growth rates are assumed to be zero, so that the two curves cross at the origin, point A. A shock to w0 > 0 shifts the 
distributive curve upwards, and, if A > 0, shifts the demand curve outward. Whether the new steady state demand growth rate 
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Six calibrations 1 2 3 4 5 6
Random seed # 13 452 437 34 42 32
PL/PS PL/FS PL/PS WL/FS WL/FS WL/FS
Elasticities
1 S-ip [.21,.39] 0.23 0.33 0.25 0.36 0.37 0.24
2 a [.28,.52] 0.47 0.52 0.52 0.40 0.40 0.32
3 P [.35,.65] 0.40 0.50 0.58 0.38 0.51 0.52
4 8 [.32,.59] 0.37 0.54 0.32 0.50 0.51 0.54
5 0i [.20,1.00] 0.56 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.74 0.67
6 ei [.20,1.00] 0.55 0.21 0.40 0.30 0.84 0.74
7 w ± [.53,.98] 0.61 0.67 0.77 0.68 0.56 0.73
8 <7i [.10,.30] 0.18 0.22 0.19 0.28 0.28 0.19
Parameters
9 0.35 0.51 0.38 0.56 0.58 0.37
10 XP 0.49 0.54 0.54 0.42 0.42 0.33
11 9 = — xp -0.14 -0.03 -0.16 0.14 0.16 0.04
12 A -0.15 0.15 0.09 0.13 -0.36 -0.28
13 x - e -0.01 0.18 0.24 -0.01 -0.52 -0.32
14 Aqt +  (1 - qt )0 -0.14 0.01 -0.11 0.13 0.02 -0.02
15 Aq1ip1 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.01
16 xP 0.22 0.27 0.32 0.21 0.28 0.28
17 1 - Aq1ip1 -  xP 0.78 0.74 0.68 0.80 0.70 0.71
18 0[1 - A q 1xp1 - x P Y 1 -0.18 -0.04 -0.23 0.17 0.23 0.06
19 ^i 0.02 -0.23 0.20 -0.17 -0.23 -0.20
Table 1: These six different calibrations are used for illustrative simulations. The top part of the table reports 
elasticities drawn from uniform probability distributions with bounds indicated in square brackets. The bottom 
part reports the most important composite parameters. Row 11 shows 0 ,  which determines the demand regime. 
The difference shown in row 14 determines whether demand growth responds positively to a wage shock. Row 18 
is the slope of the effective demand curve, its inverse is the slope of xpE D . Row 19 reports the slope of the 
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Sim ulations 1 2 3 4 5 6
Random seed# 13 452 437 34 42 32
PL/PS PL/FS PL/PS WL/FS WL/FS WL/FS
5% W a g e  increase
l GDP -0.95 0.01 -0.84 0.80 0.09 -0.18
2 Wage Share 4.05 3.85 3.90 3.47 3.56 4.07
3 Investm ent -4.08 -3.86 -4.35 -2.41 -2.72 -2.63
4 Net exports 0.05 -0.47 0.34 -1.42 -2.02 -1.00
5 Employment -0.60 0.00 -0.57 0.40 0.04 -0.08
6 Productivity -0.35 0.00 -0.27 0.40 0.04 -0.10
7 Propensity to  save -3.17 -4.33 -3.28 -4.26 -4.53 -3.37
8 Real (product) wage 3.72 3.90 3.65 3.94 3.66 4.00
9 Inflation (Q) 0.89 1.10 0.89 1.34 1.37 0.93
10 Profit rate -8.42 -7.12 -8.02 -5.61 -6.45 -7.72
5%  P roductiv ity  increase
1 GDP 1.25 -0.21 1.15 -1.35 -0.19 0.13
2 Wage Share -6.21 -6.08 -6.58 -5.56 -5.30 -6.65
3 Investm ent 5.93 5.72 6.96 3.58 3.80 3.95
4 Net exports 0.20 0.97 -0.26 2.39 3.21 1.91
5 Employment -4.01 -4.85 -4.02 -5.40 -4.85 -4.71
6 Productivity 5.48 4.88 5.39 4.28 4.90 5.07
7 Propensity to  save 4.86 6.84 5.55 6.83 6.73 5.50
8 Real (product) wage -1.06 -1.46 -1.52 -1.49 -0.64 -1.88
9 Inflation (Q) -1.42 -1.80 -1.57 -2.21 -2.09 -1.59
10 Profit rate 12.88 10.93 13.44 8.60 9.41 12.43
Table 2: Summary of simulation results. The upper part shows model responses to a 5 per cent shock to the wage 
curve intercept w0; the lower part shows model responses to a 5 per cent shock to ^0. Results are reported in 
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Sim ulations l 2 3 4 5 6
Random seed# 13 452 437 34 42 32
PL/PS PL/FS PL/PS WL/FS WL/FS WL/FS
5% In v e s tm e n t increase
1 GDP 3.55 3.83 3.95 3.42 3.87 3.92
2 Wage Share 0.06 -0.65 0.63 -0.41 -0.63 -0.61
3 Investm ent 6.42 7.66 6.73 6.69 7.58 7.51
4 Net exports -3.56 -3.75 -4.03 -3.34 -3.52 -3.74
5 Employment 2.23 1.76 2.67 1.68 1.89 1.80
6 Productivity 1.29 2.03 1.25 1.71 1.94 2.09
7 Propensity to  save -0.04 0.74 -0.53 0.50 0.80 0.51
8 Real (product) wage 1.35 1.36 1.89 1.29 1.29 1.46
9 Inflation (Q) 0.01 -0.19 0.15 -0.16 -0.25 -0.14
10 Profit rate 3.43 5.08 2.75 4.19 5.07 5.10
5%  N o m in a l dep rec ia tion
1 GDP 0.92 -0.98 -0.60 -0.78 2.43 1.91
2 Wage Share 0.02 0.17 -0.10 0.10 -0.40 -0.30
3 Investm ent 0.35 -0.66 -0.26 -0.37 1.54 1.17
4 Net exports 3.99 3.00 3.33 3.02 4.79 4.39
5 Employment 0.58 -0.46 -0.41 -0.39 1.19 0.88
6 Productivity 0.34 -0.53 -0.19 -0.40 1.22 1.02
7 Propensity to  save -0.01 -0.19 0.08 -0.12 0.51 0.25
8 Real (product) wage 0.35 -0.36 -0.29 -0.30 0.82 0.72
9 Inflation (Q) 0.00 0.05 -0.02 0.04 -0.16 -0.07
10 Profit rate -0.03 -2.21 -1.34 -1.87 2.24 1.55
Table 3: Summary of simulation results. The upper part shows model responses to a 5 per cent shock to 
autonomous investment /0; the lower part shows model responses to a 5 per cent shock to e .  Results are reported 
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Figure 3: Slope of distributive and demand curve. The left panel shows distributions from repeated calculations of the slope of 
the distributive curve, with drawn from different uniform probability distributions: The black line shows the prior, as 
reported in Table 1. The dotted line shows a downward shift of w1 to [.34,.64], and the dashed line an upward shift of w1 to [.7, 
1.3]. The right panel shows distributions from repeated calculations of the slope of the effective demand curve, with a drawn 
from different uniform probability distributions: The black line shows the prior, the dotted line a downward shift of a to 
[.18,.33], and the dashed line an upward shift of a to [.38, .7].
Figure 4: Cross-effects. The left panel shows distributions resulting from repeated simulations of the model, here the response 
of wage share growth (ip) to "demand policy," introduced with /0=5%. The right panel shows the response of GDP growth (y) 
to "wage policy," introduced with w0- 5%. The parameter shifts correspond to those of Figure 3 above: In the left panel, is 
varied; in the right panel, a.
Figure 5: Combined wage and productivity policy. The left panel shows distributions resulting from repeated simulations, here 
the response of wage share growth (xp) to a combined wage and productivity "policy," introduced as w0 = | 0 = 5%. The right 
panel shows the response of GDP growth (F) to the same combined policy. The parameter shifts correspond to those of Figure 
3 above: In the left panel, wx is varied; in the right panel, a.
25
